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Abstract 
This paper examines which of the Stackelberg leader or its follower has the advantage under strategic subsidy policy in 
a third market model. We show that even if governments choose export subsidies in whichever of a simultaneous-
move or sequential-move game, the leader firm always loses its first-mover advantage in a Stackelberg duopoly. 
Furthermore, we examine the endogenous timing of subsidies by governments and show that the second-mover 
advantage occurs with regard to profit and welfare under the endogenous timing of subsidies.
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     1. Introduction
This paper examines which of the Stackelberg leader or its follower has the advantage
under strategic subsidy policy in a third market model.
Since Brander and Spencer (1985) analyze the rent-shifting eﬀect of export subsidy
and the strategic interaction between export subsidies in a third-country model, many
articles have dealt with export subsidies in the context of the strategic trade policy (see
Eaton and Grossman, 1986; Hamilton and Slutsky, 1990).1 Although their successors
deal with the general demand structure and illuminate several aspects of strategic trade
policy, most of them limit their analyses to the situation in which competitive ﬁrms and
their governments choose their strategic variables simultaneously. There are several arti-
cles on the sequential-move game under strategic subsidy policy which should be referred
to. Arvan (1991) concludes that demand uncertainty may cause the sequential-move of
the policy choice by governments in the third-country model. Ohkawa, Okamura, and
Tawada (2002) have endogenized the timing of government intervention under interna-
tional oligopoly. Although the sequential-move game by governments is analyzed in their
papers, they focus on the endogenous timing of the policy decision by governments and
are not interested in Stackelberg competition. On the other hand, Balboa, Daughety, and
Reinganum (2004) analyze Cournot and Stackelberg competition, although they focus
only on the situation in which governments simultaneously choose to provide subsidies
for their ﬁrms.
In reality, due to the diﬀerences in the abilities of the governments in implementing
and enforcing trade policies, there exists a time lag between the subsidy decisions made by
the governments. In this paper, taking the Stackelberg quantity competition into consid-
eration, we examine how the competitive advantage between ﬁrms changes depending on
the timing of the policy decision-making. We show that even if governments choose export
subsidies in whichever of a simultaneous-move or sequential-move game, the leader ﬁrm
always loses its ﬁrst-mover advantage in a Stackelberg duopoly. Furthermore, we exam-
ine the endogenous timing of subsidies by governments and show that the second-mover
advantage occurs for the follower ﬁrm and its government under the endogenous timing
of subsidies. This paper explains how the eﬀectiveness of subsidy policy is inﬂuenced by
the timing of output decision.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the
model. In Section 3, the proﬁt and welfare in Stackelberg equilibrium are derived under
the exogenous timing of the subsidy choice by governments, and the main results on
the competitive advantage are presented. We examine whether the governments move
ﬁrst or second in the ﬁrst-stage and show that second-mover advantage occurs under the
endogenous timing of subsidy choice by governments. Section 4 concludes the paper.
1 For an appropriate survey on strategic trade policy under international oligopoly, see Lahiri and
Ono (2004).
12. The Model
Let us consider an imperfect quantity competition in a third country ` al aBrander
and Spencer (1985). Two identical ﬁrms produce and sell homogenous goods in a third
country. The ﬁrm from country i =1 ,2i si n d e x e da sﬁ r mi =1 ,2. Both ﬁrms produce
only for the third market. Firm i produces quantity qi and the total quantity is Q ≡ q1+q2.
The inverse demand function is denoted by P(Q) ≡ a−bQ. For analytical simpliﬁcation,
it is assumed that all ﬁrms have an identical cost structure. The constant marginal cost
is denoted by c. It is assumed that a>c>0a n db>0.
Government i of country i can implement the per unit export subsidy, si ≥ 0. The
proﬁt of ﬁrm i is denoted by πi(qi,q j;si) ≡ (P(Q) − ei)qi;ei ≡ c − si.T h e w e l f a r e
of country i is denoted by W i(si,s j), which comprises the proﬁt from the exporting
ﬁrm i minus the cost of the export subsidy, i.e., W i(si,s j) ≡ πi(qi(si,s j),q j(si,s j);si) −
siqi(si,s j). Government i maximizes this welfare. The solution concept is the subgame
perfect equilibrium.
The timing of the game is as follows. In the ﬁrst stage, governments choose subsidy
levels simultaneously or sequentially. In the second stage, ﬁrms choose output levels in
a Stackelberg quantity competition fashion. Subsidy policies can be committed by both
the governments and observed by both the ﬁrms before the competition stage.
We now derive the subsidy, output, and proﬁt in the equilibrium by inducing backward.
We solve the subgame in the second stage in the following subsection and analyze the
Stackelberg duopoly in subsection 2.2.
2.1. Stackelberg competition in the second stage
Suppose that ﬁrm 1 is the Stackelberg leader and ﬁrm 2 is the follower w.l.o.g. Antic-
ipating the reaction function of ﬁrm 2, which is deﬁned by q2 = R2(q1), ﬁrm 1 maximizes
its proﬁt, π1(q1,R 2(q1)). The f.o.c. is π1
1 + π1
2R 
2(q1)=0 . 2 The Stackelberg output pairs
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The proﬁts under Stackelberg competition are derived as follows:
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22.2. The subsidy decision in the ﬁrst stage
In the ﬁrst stage, government i =1 ,2 maximizes the domestic welfare, i.e.,










if si ≥ 0. If
∂Wi(si,sj)
∂si < 0, the solution is si =0 . 3
3. The Second-mover Advantage
In subsection 3.1. to 3.3., we derive the Stackelberg equilibrium under the exogenous
timing of subsidy choice by governments. We classify three cases: (i) both governments
move simultaneously; (ii) government 1 moves ﬁrst and government 2 moves second; (iii)
government 2 moves ﬁrst and government 1 moves second.
3.1. Simultaneous case
First, let us consider the simultaneous case in which both governments choose subsidies si-
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3 . We solve the intersection














































When both governments decide on subsidy levels simultaneously, the subsidy policy of
the government of the leader ﬁrm does not work in the Stackelberg model.


















3 The s.o.c. and the stability of the equilibrium are satisﬁed.
33.2. Sequential case in which government 1 moves ﬁrst
Second, let us examine the sequential case in which government 1 chooses its subsidy
level ﬁrst. Government 1 moves ﬁrst and then government 2 decides s2 after observing




2,g i v e ns1. By direct calculation, the reaction function








3 . The reaction function is obtained using the
same procedure as in the simultaneous case.
Government 1 induces this reaction function and maximizes W S1(s1,R 2(s1)). By the
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3.3. Sequential case in which government 2 moves ﬁrst
Third, we examine the sequential case in which government 2 moves ﬁrst and then gov-
ernment 1 decides s1 after observing s2. Observing s2, government 1 decides the subsidy
s1 = R1(s2) to maximize W S1(s1,s 2)=π1(qS
1(s1,s 2),qS
2(s1,s 2);s1) − s1qS
1,g i v e ns2.T h e




2 ) = 0. Government 2 induces this reaction by govern-
ment 1 and maximizes W S2(0,s 2). Thus, the obtained result is the same as that in the
simultaneous case.
Lemma 1. Suppose that ﬁrm 1 is the Stackelberg leader. The equilibrium in the sequential
case in which government 2 moves ﬁrst is the same as that in the simultaneous case.
In this case, the government does not subsidize its Stackelberg leader ﬁrm.
43.4. Comparison of the equilibrium proﬁts of the leader and follower
By comparing the equilibrium proﬁts of the leader and follower in the above three cases,
the following proposition is immediately obtained.
Proposition 1. Suppose that ﬁrm 1 is the Stackelberg leader. Regardless of the timing of
the moves of both governments, ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt is smaller than that of ﬁrm 2, πS1 <π S2.
In other words, second-mover advantage occurs.
Proposition 1 implies that in the previous stage wherein the governments decide the
subsidy levels, the proﬁt of the leader is less than that of the follower in contrast to
the usual result under Stackelberg competition. If the governments can exercise the
subsidy policies simultaneously, the leader ﬁrm loses its ﬁrst-mover advantage under the
Stackelberg competition. This is because the government of the Stackelberg leader ﬁrm
cannot provide any advantage by subsidizing it. In the sequential case in which the
government of the leader moves ﬁrst, the government of the leader ﬁrm faces a trade-oﬀ.
The government desires both to improve the competitive position of the domestic ﬁrm
and to maintain a lower subsidy level. As the Stackelberg leader produces more than
the follower, the government of the leader ﬁrm is not required to improve its competitive
position, and hence, it can reduce subsidy.
Although, at the ﬁrst glance, it appears that the Stackelberg leader has the ﬁrst-
mover advantage, the government of the leader cannot inﬂuence the improvement of its
competitive position, and the follower can be supported by its government.
3.5. The Second-mover Advantage under the Endogenous Timing
In subsection 3.4., we show that the second-mover advantage occurs under the exoge-
nous timing of subsidy choice by governments. In this subsection, we examine whether
the governments prefer moving ﬁrst or second and present the main result under the
endogenous timing of subsidy choice by governments.
Let us consider the situation in which both governments can choose the timing of
move in the ﬁrst stage, in order to maximize its welfare level. In this game wherein
governments choose whether to move ﬁrst or second, suppose that if both governments
choose to move ﬁrst or second, the subsidy decision is made simultaneously in the ﬁrst
stage. Otherwise, one government chooses to move ﬁrst, the other government chooses to
move second, and the subsidy decision is made sequentially. From (7), (11), and Lemma 1,
the game of the endogenous timing by governments is presented in the following normal-
form representation:
Table 1 around here
As shown in Table 1, to move ﬁrst is the weakly dominant strategy for both governments,
and it is conﬁrmed that the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of this game are (ﬁrst, ﬁrst)
and (second, ﬁrst). The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is represented as that in which
5government 1 chooses to move ﬁrst with any probability p ∈ [0,1], and government 2
moves ﬁrst.
By comparing the equilibrium proﬁt and welfare, the result is summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose that ﬁrm 1 is the Stackelberg leader, and governments can choose
the timing for deciding on the subsidy. The welfare of government 1 is smaller than that of
government 2, and the proﬁt of the Stackelberg leader is smaller than that of the follower,
i.e., W S1 <W S2 and πS1 <π S2. In other words, second-mover advantage occurs for the
ﬁrm and the government.
Proof. In the game of the endogenous timing, it is satisﬁed that W S1 =
(a−c)2
18b <W S2 =
(a−c)2
12b and πS1 =
(a−c)2
18b <π S2 =
(a−c)2
4b .
Proposition 2 implies that the government of a country with the Stackelberg leader
enjoys less welfare than the government in another country with the follower. When
governments compete in subsidy, the original competitive advantage possessed by the
Stackelberg leader is lost. This result suggests that government intervention via subsidy
is possible to change the competitive condition signiﬁcantly.
4. Conclusion
This paper examined which of the Stackelberg leader or its follower has the advantage
under strategic subsidy policy in a third market model. Two main results expressed
in Proposition 1 and 2 are as follows: First, regardless of the timing of moves of both
governments, the proﬁt of the leader is smaller than that of the follower. We show
that the second-mover advantage occurs under the exogenous timing of subsidy choice.
Second, we show that taking the endogenous timing of subsidy choice by governments
into consideration, the second-mover advantage occurs for the ﬁrm and the government.
Our result suggests that if governments can intervene in domestic ﬁrms with any
policy instruments, the competitive advantage of ﬁrms may vastly change from the initial
market competitive condition such as Cournot and Stackelberg competition. Even if a
ﬁrm is a Stackelberg follower in the third market, the subsidization by its government can
eliminate the initial competitive disadvantage entirely. Therefore, we conclude that the
timing of export subsidy policies enforced by governments aﬀects the ﬁrms’ competitive
position more signiﬁcantly.
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7Table 1: The endogenous timing of subsidy choice
Government 2
Government 1
First Second
First
(a−c)2
18b ,
(a−c)2
12b
(a−c)2
16b ,
3(a−c)2
64b
Second
(a−c)2
18b ,
(a−c)2
12b
(a−c)2
18b ,
(a−c)2
12b
8